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Cyberattacks have significant economic, political, and privacy-related impacts in Brazil. 
Regulatory and enforcement measures have been insufficient to prevent these attacks. The 
authors analyze these trends and assess some recent measures to address these issues. 
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Cyberattacks are a serious problem in Brazil.1 It was reported that, in October 2019, the personal 
information of 92 million Brazilians was auctioned off in an underground forum. The culprits 
were suspected to have illegally accessed the data from a stolen government database.2 
According to Symantec, in 2017, more than 60% of Brazilian Internet users (some 62 million 
people) were victimized by cybercriminals leading to a loss of US$22 billion.3 In 2018, such 
attacks affected more than 70 million citizens.4 The cybersecurity firm Trend Micro’s study 
indicated that Brazil was the world’s second largest victim of ransomware attacks in the first 
quarter of 2019. Brazil’s ransomware attacks account for 10.64% of the global ransomware 
attacks.5 A 2019 report of the International Telecommunication Union noted that Brazil’s 
cyberattack-related economic losses were second highest in the world.6 
 
In 2018, Brazilian companies lost more than US$20 billion to cyberattacks.4 The average annual 
cost of cybercrime for a Brazilian company was estimated at US$7.24 million in 2018.7 
Unfortunately, cybersecurity initiatives have not been well developed in Brazil to deal with these 
growing threats. While Brazil has developed guidelines and best practices to deal with 
cyberthreats, prevention measures and a national security strategy is lacking,8,9 
 
On the privacy front, the Brazilian General Data Protection Law [Lei Geral de Proteção de 
Dados (LGPD)] was ratified in the congress in mid-2018, which was scheduled to into effect on 
15 August 2020. The LGPD is inspired by and modeled after the European Union’s General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR).10 However, Brazil lacks a national data protection authority to 
enforce basic provisions of the LGPD. The country’s congress had passed the creation of a 
federal agency, the National Data Protection Authority, or Autoridade Nacional de Proteção de 
Dados, to enforce data protection rules.11 Nonetheless, then-President Michel Temer vetoed the 
legislation, arguing that such initiatives should be undertaken by the executive branch rather than 
the congress. Before leaving office, his government had formed an interim agency with a two-
year mandate. However, after the current president Jair Bolsonaro took office in January 2019, 
the ability of the new agency to impose penalties for the violation of the LGPD has been 
restricted.11 
 
Cyberthreats Facing Brazil 
 
Brazil has earned its reputation as the “king of the banking Trojan.”12 A Trojan can identify the 
Internet Protocol address of a user of an infected web page, which enables it to perform targeted 
attacks.13 The Brazilian financial system faces about 15,500 cyberattacks and 500 new malware 
threats daily.14 Bancos, a well-known password-stealing Trojan, which is designed to steal 
banking information mainly from Latin American consumers, is believed to have originated in 
Brazil. Other well-known banking Trojans, such as ZeuS, SpyEye, and CARBERP, are also 
reported to be increasingly common in Brazil.15 
 
Brazil’s cybercrime setting presents a security professional with a significantly more challenging 
landscape. One of the reasons is that antivirus/malware products used are locally developed.1 
Unlike their Eastern European counterparts, Brazilian cybercrime groups have not realized the 
need to internationalize their operations due to Brazil’s well-developed financial sector.12 The 
Brazilian hackers mainly target Brazilians.16 
 
Table 1. Real and perceived cyberthreats facing Brazil: Some examples. 
 Internal External 
Political • June 2011: The hacking group LulzSec shut down the 
website of Petrobras with a DDoS attack for part of a 
day.  
• 2013: Anonymous Brazil defaced the website of the 
Brazilian Air Force.17  
• 2014: Anonymous Brazil’s attack (publishing stolen 
usernames and passwords) on Brazilian government 
websites to protest against the 2014 FIFA World Cup.  
• 2018: Anonymous group’s Twitter campaign to 
interfere with the Brazilian election 
#OpEleiçãoContraOFascismo. 
• Feb. 2011: A Brazilian power plant was infected by 
Conficker worm, which caused its management systems 
to freeze up and not display data.18  
• 2018: Russian hackers’ interference in the presidential 
elections using social media. 
Economic • 2014: Cyberattack on Boleto Bancário system (a 
Brazilian payment method).  
• February 2012: a coordinated attack that coincided 
with quarterly earnings reports and victimized most 
major Brazilian banks.19 
• The NSA’s alleged industrial espionage on the oil 
giant Petrobras.  
• OGlobo: Canadian spy agencies tracked the Brazil’s 
Mines and Energy Ministry emails and phone calls as 
well as communications to other countries.  
• 2012: a cyber espionage campaign targeted high-
profile oil companies, including those of Brazil, 
according to Dell Secure Work CTU. 
 
Recent measures have further increased Brazil’s vulnerability. In April 2019, in an attempt to 
improve efficiency in the financial system, the central bank (Banco Central do Brasil) published 
new guidelines that require financial institutions to share customer data with third parties (such 
as financial technology companies), product aggregators, and nonfinancial companies (such as 
Uber and Google14). These third parties may not have the same level of security as banks and 
thus may be more vulnerable to attack. Table 1 presents additional internal economic examples 
of real and perceived cyberthreats facing Brazil. 
 
In a high-profile cyberattack reported in mid-2014, Brazil’s popular payment method, Boleto 
Bancário, was targeted. Criminals attempted to steal US$3.75 billion. Researchers from the 
Internet security company RSA traced the crime to a gang in Brazil.20 A report from the Igarape 
Institute noted that a few cybercriminals who had been caught fit a profile: “well-educated, 
upper-middle-class males from 25 to 35 years old.”21 
 
Brazil also faces politically motivated internal and external cyberthreats, such as distributed 
denial of service (DDoS) attacks and the Conficker Worm (a virus that disables security features 
and backup settings as well as creates a path for communication from remote systems) (Table 1). 
In 2011, LulzSecBrazil, a Brazilian component of the hacker group LulzSec (Lulz Security), 
released personal information including identification numbers and bank details of the 
employees of energy producer Petrobras.22 
 
Websites have also been attacked to interfere with elections and protests. For instance, the 
websites of Brazilian government agencies have been attacked frequently by Anonymous (a 
secret group of online hackers) and other hacking groups.23 In June 2014, as a protest against the 
2014 FIFA World Cup, the hacker group Anonymous Brazil defaced a number of Brazilian 
government websites. The Foreign Ministry’s server and FIFA partner sites were attacked, which 
compromised emails and attachments. An alleged Anonymous hacker emailed Reuters news 
organization the following threat: “Companies and institutions that work with a government that 
denies the basic rights of its people to promote a private, exclusive, and corrupt sports event will 
be targeted.”24 
 
Brazil is also reported to be among the top countries in terms of the government’s actions to 
control and monitor citizens’ activities online. For instance, around the time of the 2013 
antigovernment protests, the country’s intelligence agencies allegedly compiled a list of 700 
topics that they considered potential security threats. As a result, an operation code-named 
Mosaico was launched that actively trawled through social media websites such as Facebook, 
Twitter, WhatsApp, and Instagram.25 
 
A report of the IT security company Imperva noted that “strong government or corporate 
resentment in a population is a key factor” behind the escalation of cyberattacks in 
Brazil.21 Thus, Brazilians perceived that many of their targets deserved attack by the hacktivists. 
Imperva notes, “In the minds of many Brazilians, the cyber mayhem was no crime.”26 This was a 
crucial factor in increasing hacking and cyberattacks in Brazil. 
 
There are also external threats. Russian hackers reportedly tried to interfere with the country’s 
2018 presidential elections using social media.27 For instance, according to the cybersecurity 
firm FireEye, the hackers used bots to increase the distribution of posts that criticized the 
Brazilian democratic model and questioned the legitimacy of the election. The Brazilian branch 
of the Anonymous group (@anonopsbrazil) had also started a Twitter campaign 
#OpEleiçãoContraOFascismo (Operation Against Fascism). 
 
A turning point for Brazil was when U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) whistleblower 
Edward Snowden revealed the NSA’s alleged industrial espionage on the oil giant Petrobras, 
Latin America’s largest energy producer. The United States has denied spying for commercial 
advantage; many Brazilians do not seem to be convinced. President Dilma Rousseff argued that 
if the allegation of the NSA’s breaking into Petrobras computers is true, then gathering economic 
information would be the motive.28 The networks of Ministry of Mines and Energy were also 
hacked, which, together with Petrobras, was involved in the auction of oil fields.29 Specifically, 
Brazilians think that the company’s data on Brazil’s offshore oil reserves and plans for allocating 
licenses for exploration to foreign companies were the intended targets.1 
 
In 2012, the Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit (CTU) research team tracked a 
cyberespionage campaign that targeted high-profile oil companies in a number of countries, 
including those in Brazil.30 Likewise, according to Brazilian television OGlobo, Canadian spy 
agencies tracked the Brazil’s Mines and Energy Ministry emails and phone calls as well as 
communications to other countries, including the Ecuador-based Latin American Energy 
Organization.31 
 
Cyberthreat Mitigation Challenges 
 
Brazil has faced many challenges in dealing with the cyberthreats, as there is severe congestion 
in the law enforcement system—only 5–8% of crimes are solved in Brazil.32 This remarkable 
situation is a direct consequence of the scarcity of law enforcement resources. A prevailing 
culture of violence takes most of the available law enforcement resources with little law 
enforcement left to address cybercrimes. There is also a cybersecurity skill shortage. In a global 
survey conducted by Sophos in 13 of the major world economies in 2019, 83% of Brazilian 
respondents reported that they face challenges in recruiting people with cybersecurity skills.33 
 




In terms of strategic planning to deal with cyberthreats, Brazil has lagged behind other regional 
economies, such as Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. For instance, in 2017, Chile and Mexico 
published their Cybersecurity Strategies, which outlined what, how, and when to address various 
types and categories of cybersecurity risks. Mexico’s focus has been to boost its economy and 
innovation, strengthen civil society and public institutions, and improve public and national 
security. Chile’s cybersecurity strategy aims to improve its digital infrastructure and people’s 
rights in cyberspace, develop a cybersecurity culture, and promote the growth if its cybersecurity 
industry. Likewise, Argentina’s Programa Nacional de Infraestructuras Críticas de Información y 
Ciberseguridad seeks to improve the regulatory framework for identifying and protecting its 
digital infrastructures.34 Brazil has realized the urgency of addressing the cybersecurity threats. 
The Institutional Security Cabinet, which is an executive cabinet office of the country’s federal 
government, has been working to develop a national cybersecurity strategy.9 In November 2019, 
the Brazilian government announced the creation of a network of eight R&D labs.35 One of them 
will focus on the use of artificial intelligence technology in cybersecurity, which will involve the 
Brazilian Army.36 Nonetheless, the Brazilian cybersecurity strategy has much to learn from other 




Currently, Brazil has more than 40 legal norms at the federal level that directly and indirectly 
deal with the protection of privacy and personal data. These norms often function in a sector-
based system and sometimes are conflictive. The lack of clear legal rules has hindered legal 
certainty and predictability, which has reduced the country’s competitiveness.37 The LGPD is 
expected to address these concerns.38 
 
The LGPD is described as Brazil’s first significant attempt to deal with digital privacy.39 
Whereas the existing laws are primarily directed toward regulating Internet service providers and 
requiring them to store and make data available for law enforcement and government agencies, 
the LGPD addresses Brazilian citizens’ right to data privacy and security. It will replace the 
existing patchwork of legislation governing cybersecurity issues, such as the Civil Rights 
Framework for the Internet (Internet Act), the Civil Code, and the Consumer Protection Code. 
 
As is the case of GDPR, the LGPD has outlined new rules regarding how personal data can be 
collected, used, processed, and stored.40 The LGPD will affect all industries and economic 
sectors. For instance, Article 18 of the LGPD gives consumers rights for their personal data. 
Organizations are required to ensure personal data are “anonymized, redacted, or eliminated.”41 
The country has also created the Brazilian National Data Protection Authority to enforce the 
LGPD.40 
 
The LGPD applies to domestic as well as foreign entities that collect or process personal data in 
Brazil or provide goods or services to individuals in Brazil. For instance, a business that collects 
or processes personal data of individuals in Brazil is required to follow the LGPD even if it does 
not have a physical presence in Brazil. The fines of violating the LGPD can be up to 2% of the 
company’s gross revenues derived from Brazil, or 50 million reals (about US$13 million).40 
 
Brazil’s social, economic, political, and cultural characteristics provide insights into the key 
drivers of cybercrimes and the nature of cybersecurity measures. This country has been exposed 
to significant cyberthreats due to the country’s financially motivated cybercriminal gangs. The 
detection of threats are difficult since many of the domestically originated attacks do not pursue 
foreign targets and hence are unknown to international security researchers. 
 
Finally, there is an underlying and subtle warning here. Countries that do not treat cybersecurity 
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